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Introduction to the Symposium:
Self and Other: Cognitive Perspectives on Trust, 
Empathy and the Self
Claire A. Hill
“Self  and  Other:  Cognitive  Perspectives  on  Trust, 
Empathy and the Self” is the inaugural symposium of the 
newly  founded  Institute  for  Law  and  Rationality  at  the 
University of Minnesota Law School.
The  following  collection  of  articles  represents  the 
product  of  a  conference  held  in  April  2007  at  the 
University  of  Minnesota,  hosted  and  sponsored  by  the 
Institute for Law and Rationality and co-sponsored by the 
Gruter  Institute  for  Law  and  Behavioral  Research.  All 
views expressed in the symposium articles resulting from 
the  conference  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not 
necessarily represent the views of the  Minnesota Journal 
of Law, Science & Technology.  To view the full video of 
the  conference  and  for  more  information,  visit 
http://local.law.umn.edu/iflr/april2007conferenceagenda.h
tml.
The Institute for Law and Rationality was founded to 
encourage scholarship that “gets it right” about people—
an  antidote,  as  it  were,  to  the  admittedly  unrealistic 
rational  person  model,  as  modified  by  the  supposedly 
more  realistic  behavioral  law  and  economics  model.   I 
have argued that behavioral law and economics, in its first 
wave,  has  entrenched  many  of  the  more  problematic 
pathologies  of  the  rational  person  model.1  Deviations 
from the orthodox model are accepted, but characterized 
as “irrationalities.”  The Institute seeks to depart from this 
paradigm, in which there is an orthodox model from which 
there are deviations, “irrationalities.” Rather, it  seeks to 
develop  a  process-based  notion  of  rationality,  in  the 
tradition  of  the  Nobel  prize-winning  economist  and 
1 © 2008 Claire A. Hill.
2
. Claire A. Hill,  Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioural  
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J.  563 (2004).
637
CLAIRE A. HILL, "SELF AND OTHER: COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON TRUST, EMPATHY AND THE SELF," 9(2) MINN.  
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 637-642 (2008).
638 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
political  scientist  Herbert  Simon.2 To  that  end,  in  this 
symposium, scholars from law, economics, neuroscience 
and  psychology  consider  various  ways  in  which  people 
arrive at views of  themselves and others.   Much of  the 
scholarship  in  the  fields  of  trust,  empathy and the  self 
emphasizes the non-cognitive, more emotive features; the 
symposium papers  focus  more  on  the  cognitive.   That 
being  said,  the  non-cognitive  and emotive  features  are 
not  ignored.   They  are,  however,  treated  as  part  of  a 
descriptive  account  of  how people  make  decisions  and 
come  to  their  world-views,  not  as  explanations  for 
irrationalities and “mistakes.”
The  first  paper,  Negative  Dimensions  of  Identity:  A 
Research Agenda for Law and Public Policy, by Avner Ben-
Ner and Claire  A.  Hill,  argues that  some dimensions of 
identity  can  have  negative  effects.   When members  of 
ethnic  or  religious  groups  come  into  close  proximity, 
violent conflict may result, especially insofar as a group 
member’s identity  as  a group member comes to crowd 
out other dimensions of his or her identity.   The article 
argues for a research strategy to consider how law might 
help minimize these negative effects.
In Identity, Culture and Stories: Empathy and the War 
on Terrorism, William D. Casebeer argues that it is critical 
to understand how terrorists construct their narratives of 
what they are doing.  He argues for an important role for 
narrative in understanding and explaining the world and 
one’s  own  place  in  it,  and  as  providing  a  rationale  for 
one’s actions.  If we understand terrorists’ narratives, we 
can  potentially  use  that  understanding  to  construct 
counter-narratives.
The Rationality  of  Preference  Construction  (and the 
Irrationality  of  Rational  Choice),  by  Claire  A.  Hill, 
acknowledges  the  consensus  outside  of  economics  that 
preferences are constructed, and argues that economists 
should  concede  the  point,  and  develop  an  account  of 
preferences  that  takes  preference  construction  into 
2
2
. “[I]n economics, rationality is viewed in terms of the choices it 
produces;  in  the  other  social  sciences,  it  is  viewed  in  terms  of  the 
processes  it  employs.   The  rationality  of  economics  is  substantive 
rationality, while the rationality of psychology is procedural rationality.” 
Herbert A. Simon,  Rationality in Psychology and Economics,  in RATIONAL 
CHOICE:  THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25,  26  (Robin  M. 
Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (citation omitted).
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account.  Economists go wrong in thinking of preferences 
as  being  for  “traditional  objects  of  choice.”  Once 
preferences  are  acknowledged  to  be  importantly  about 
second-order attributes (such as happiness, status, views 
of  oneself  and  so  on);  that  they  are  necessarily 
constructed becomes clear.   It  is  only recently that the 
term  “carbon  footprint”  came  into  currency.   The 
preference for being, seeing oneself as, and being seen 
as,  someone  who  does  not  leave  much  of  a  carbon 
footprint will clearly dictate particular ways of comporting 
oneself,  ways  that  will  change not  only as  the concept 
evolves  but  also  as  the  person  balances  this  view  of 
herself with others she holds (of herself as, for instance, 
hard working and punctual and hence spending as little 
time  commuting  as  possible).   An  inquiry  about  the 
principles of preference construction is hence inevitable.
A  companion  piece  by  Hill,  The  Myth  of  Discovery, 
argues that the idea that preferences are fixed is part of a 
greater  “myth  of  discovery”  wherein  preferences  pre-
exist,  to  be  discovered.   That  preferences  are  partly 
discovered  and  partly  created  presents  a  theoretical 
reason  that  complements  the  mounting  empirical 
evidence that more choice is not necessarily better.
Peter  H.  Huang’s  Authentic  Happiness,  Self 
Knowledge  &  Legal  Policy surveys  happiness  research, 
and argues that it ought to have a more prominent place 
in policymaking.  Happiness as an academic subject is a 
relatively recent addition in the social sciences (although 
of  course,  not  in  fields  such  as  philosophy).   Huang 
considers  various domains in  which policymakers  might 
advance happiness.
In  Heterosexual  Sexual  Behavior  Is  Governed  by 
Social  Exchange  and  Basic  Economic  Principles:  Sexual 
Economics Theory, Kathleen D. Vohs and Jannine Lasaleta 
explain, and argue for the explanatory power of, Sexual 
Economics  Theory,  a  theory  akin  to  one  espoused  in 
evolutionary  biology  and  other  related  fields,  in  which 
women  parcel  out  sexual  favors  selectively,  with  men 
spending  considerable  time  and  energy  to  obtain  such 
favors.   They consider and discuss research that shows 
this  phenomenon  in  many  different  contexts,  including 
advertising;  they  consider  some  future  directions  for 
research in the area.
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In  Straight Acting,  Dale Carpenter argues against the 
disparagement implicit in the concept of “straight acting” 
gays.  The conduct associated with “straight acting” need 
not be either “straight” or “acting,” he says.  Carpenter 
discusses  ways  in  which  law  promotes  the  pernicious 
straight  acting  concept  and  hence  the  associated 
oppositional identity.  True liberation would be for people 
to  feel  as  though  they  need  not  “perform”  either  a 
stereotypically  gay  identity  or  a  stereotypically  straight 
identity.
In Empathy and Compassion, Richard Warner argues 
that  empathy is  an  important  means  by  which  we can 
know what someone else thinks, but that frequently we 
think we have empathy in a particular case when we do 
not.  Recognizing that someone else’s felt experience may 
be quite different than we imagine may help us be more 
tolerant.
In  Social  Influences  on  Moment-to-Moment  and 
Retrospective  Evaluations  of  Experiences, Suresh 
Ramanathan  and  Ann  L.  McGill  argue  that  when  two 
people experience certain types of common consumption 
activities  together,  they  react  more  similarly  to  one 
another and enjoy the experience more than would be the 
case if they were experiencing the activity separately.
Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi and Georg von 
Wangenheim  argue,  in  Legal  Innovation  and  the 
Compliance Paradox, that when the law’s expressive force 
is strong, if law is made more severe, violations decrease, 
as  does  resistance  to  the  law.   But  where  the  law’s 
expressive force is weaker, sudden increases in penalties 
may lead to greater resistance and more violations.
In  Intentions,  Guilt  and  Social  Interactions,  J.  Atsu 
Amegashie  considers  situations  where  intentions  affect 
payoffs.  One making an invitation may be motivated by 
guilt rather than sincerely wanting the other to accept the 
invitation.   In  different  contexts,  people  may  have 
different  reactions  to  insincerity,  for  instrumental  or 
intrinsic reasons.  Taking insincerity into account shows 
that sometimes, mutually beneficial trades do not happen.
Mario J. Rizzo argues, in Justice Versus Benevolence: A 
Modern  Humean  View,  that  the  same  action  can  be 
viewed  as  an  application  of  justice  or  a  denial  of 
beneficence depending on whether one is construing it at 
CLAIRE A. HILL, "SELF AND OTHER: COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON TRUST, EMPATHY AND THE SELF," 9(2) MINN.  
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 637-642 (2008).
2008] SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION 641
a higher or lower level of abstraction.  There may be a 
tendency  to  look  at  lower  levels  of  abstraction  thus 
introducing a bias into the system. The paper suggests 
that mechanisms to counter this bias might be desirable.
In Social and Emotional Influences on Decision Making 
and the Brain, Mauricio R. Delgado and James G. Dilmore 
consider  how  learning  may  be  affected  by  one’s  prior 
beliefs.   More  specifically,  if  a  person  has  prior  social 
information about another, she may interpret the other’s 
behavior  differently  than  she  would  without  such 
information.  Her prior information that someone is “good” 
may make her slow to take in the other’s bad behavior 
and interpret it as such.  The authors present evidence of 
their thesis from scans showing the extent and areas of 
brain activation. The paper discusses implications for law; 
it  cautions  particularly  to  be  mindful  of  a  person’s 
preconceptions  as  she’s  being  considered  for  possible 
inclusion on a jury.
Some of the assertions from the symposium papers 
are:  The  concept  of  “straight  acting”  pushes  people 
towards either acting straight or having an “oppositional” 
identity; both are inauthentic.  It is too easy for us to think 
that we can analogize from our experience to another’s: 
empathy  can  indeed  be  a  good  tool  for  understanding 
others, but only when used with appropriate cautions and 
caveats.  Our prior beliefs about someone may influence 
how  we  take  in  future  information  about  that  person, 
making us slow to believe “bad” things about someone we 
have  thought  of  as  “good.”  Our  reactions  to  various 
experiences are not dictated by the “fundamental” nature 
of the experience itself: aspects of the situation in which 
one has the experience, including whether one is alone or 
with  another  person  and,  if  the  latter,  what  the  other 
person  thinks,  is  relevant.   What  we  think  of  as  our 
“identity”  may  be  malleable;  identity  may  properly  be 
thought  of  as  part  discovery  part  creation.   Our 
preferences,  too,  may  properly  be  thought  of  as  part 
discovery part creation.
The symposium papers, taken as a whole, show the 
richness of  a process based concept of rationality;  they 
show, too, through theoretical and empirical explorations 
and  methodologies,  the  different  dimensions  of  the 
human psyche that can be illuminated by an inquiry into 
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how people  come  to  their  views  of  the  world  and 
themselves rather than one that takes a narrow view of 
rationality  as  its  baseline  and identifies  deviations.  The 
symposium encouraged a dialogue that is continuing, and 
will continue in the future.
